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STATUTES:
Utah Code Ann.. § 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1992):
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause
shown, from lengthening or shortening any time
period prescribed in this chapter, except
those time period established for judicial
review.
Utah Code Ann.. § 63-46b-12(l)(a) (1988):
If a statute or the agency's rules permit
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek
review of an order by the agency or by a
superior agency, the aggrieved party may file
a written request for review within 30 days
after the issuance of the order with the
person or entity designated for that purpose
by the statute or rule.
Utah Code Ann.. § 63-46b-17(1)(b) (1987):
In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as
required by law;
(iii)set aside or modify agency action;
2

(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency
action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further
proceedings.
RULES:
Rule 6(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
When by these rules or by a notice given
thereunder or by order of the court an act is
required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may
at any time in its discretion (1) with or
without motion or notice order the period
enlarged if request therefore is made before
the expiration of the period originally
prescribed or as extended by a previous order
or (2) upon motion made after the expiration
of the specified period permit the act to be
done where the failure to act was the result
of excusable neglect; but it may not extend
the time for taking any action under rules
50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and
73(a) and (g), except to the extent and under
the conditions stated in them.
Rule 81(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
These rules shall apply to the practice and
procedure in appealing from or obtaining a
review of any order, ruling or other action of
an administrative board or agency, except
insofar as the specific statutory procedure in
connection with any such appeal or review is
in conflict or inconsistent with these rules.
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REPLY ARGUMENTS
I.

THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN
IT REVERSED THE ALJ's ORDER AND ENTERED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MAGCORP AND ALSO WHEN
IT ORDERED MAGCORP TO PROVIDE AND PAY FOR
LAUNDRY SERVICES FOR ITS EMPLOYEES.

Respondent, Industrial Commission of Utah, concedes the legal
and factual correctness of the argument raised in Point II of
Magnesium Corporation of America's

("Magcorp") opening brief.

Respondent's Brief at 5, 6-8. Based on similar legal principles,
respondent also necessarily concedes the argument raised in Point
III of Magcorp's opening brief.

In fact, respondent fails to

address Magcorp's Point III. It is therefore undisputed that the
Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law when it summarily
reversed the ALJ's June 10, 1992 Order and entered summary judgment
against Magcorp and also when it ordered Magcorp to provide and pay
for laundry services for its employees.
With those concessions having been made, only two main issues
remain to be decided by this court.

Those issues - whether this

court should remand the case for further evidentiary hearing and
whether the Commission properly exercised jurisdiction over this
matter - are further addressed in Points II and III of this Reply
Brief.
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II.

REMAND OF THIS MATTER TO EITHER THE COMMISSION
OR THE ALJ IS IMPROPER KT THIS CASE.

Respondent requests,
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judicial

review

of

agency

(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as
required by law;
(iii)set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency
action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further
proceedings.
Magcorp requests this court to grant relief pursuant to § 63-46b17(1)(b)(i) and (iii). The Industrial Commission's actions should
be set aside and the ALJ's June 10, 1992 Order and the Findings Of
Fact And Conclusions Of Law should be reinstated.

Respondent's

request that the case be remanded for an additional evidentiary
hearing pursuant to § 63-46b-17(l)(b)(v) contradicts its earlier
statement that the Industrial Commission's decisions should be "set
aside", presumably pursuant to § 63-46b-17(b)(iii). Respondent's
Brief at 8.

In addition, there are no disputed questions of fact

that were preserved by UOSH and then detailed in an orderly fashion
in its Brief to support the claimed need for an evidentiary
hearing.
Even if this court were to determine that the Industrial
Commission properly exercised jurisdiction over this matter, a
remand to the Commission for any purpose other than to direct the
Commission to return the case to the ALJ for a full hearing
addressing the merits of the Citation And Notification Of Penalty
at issue would be improper and would substantially prejudice
6
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III. BECAUSE UOSH FILED ITS MOTION FOR REVIEW
THIRTY-SIX DAYS AFTER THE UNDERLYING ORDER WAS
"ISSUED," THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COULD NOT
EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE, AND THIS
COURT'S LIMITED REMAND COULD NOT INVEST THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WITH JURISDICTION TO
ENTER ITS ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME.
Respondent incorrectlv claims that UOSH's fail irp +•'-• n i e it**
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1992)
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Utah Code Ann., § 6 3-4 6b-12(1)(a), has always referred to the date

It appears to this court that the statutory
instructions are quite straightforward.
***

Dusty's argument that the date of issue is
ambiguous and subject to several inconsistent
interpretations is not persuasive.
***

[W]e hold that the date the order constituting
the final agency action issues
is the date the
order bears on its face.
Support for that
conclusion is found in the UAPA itself.
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Section 63-46b-21 governs agency action on
declaratory orders• After receiving petitions
for declaratory orders, agencies may again
issue
written orders. Copies of all orders
issued in response to requests for declaratory
proceedings must be mailed
promptly
to
petitioners or other parties.
Inasmuch as
declaratory orders have the same status and
binding effect as any other orders issued
in
an adjudicative proceeding, it follows that
the differentiation between issuance
and
mailing
may not be limited to declaratory
orders alone.
Dusty's 842 P.2d at 870.

Furthermore, like the petitioner in

Dusty's. UOSH had actual and constructive notice of the June 10,
1992 date appearing of the ALJ's Order and the Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law.

Dusty7s 842 P. 2d at 870.

The analysis

utilized by the Utah Supreme Court in Dusty/s is consistent with
general principles of statutory construction:
[I]t is helpful to examine preceding sections
within the same Act.
Indeed, to interpret
section 16-11-13, basic rules of statutory
construction compel us to look at the
Professional Corporation Act in its entirety.
See Morton Int'1,
Inc. v. Auditing
Div., 814
P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991) (fI[T]erms of a
statute
are
to
be
interpreted
as a
comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal
fashion."); CP Nat'l
Corp. v. Public
Serv.
Comm'n,
678 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1981)
(doubtful words are to be determined in light
of their association with surrounding words
and phrases).
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards. 240 U.A.R. 4, 5,

P.2d

(Utah

1994) .
At the heart of respondent's argument that its Motion For
8
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A cardinal rule of statutory construction is
that courts are not to infer substantive terms
into the text that were not already there.
Rather, the interpretation must be based on
the language used, and the court has no power
to rewrite the statute to conform to an

n

intention not expressed. Mountain States
Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 155 P. 2d
184, 185 (Utah 1945); see Trittipo,
561 N.E.
2d at 1203 ("The statute should be interpreted
on the basis of what was written, and courts
should not search for subtle or not readily
apparent intention of the legislature.").
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards. 240 U.A.R. at 6.

Section 63-46b-l(9)

is not a specific grant of authority to do anything.

The clear

language of § 63-46b-12(l)(a) allowing 30 days should control.
Respondent has made no effort to counter Magcorp's argument that
the strained interpretation the Industrial Commission adopted and
that respondent advances now on appeal is simply inconsistent with
sensible notions of finality and judicial economy. Under the rule
for

which

respondent

argues,

the

result

would

be

chaotic

administrative and judicial appellate procedure. See e.g. Silva v.
Dept. of Employment Security. 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 1990)
(per curiam); Isaacson v. Doriousr 669 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah 1983).
"Endorsing such a procedure would allow mischievous counsel to use
the right... [to belatedly request an enlargement of time] as a
tool for needless, and in some cases harmful delay."

Maverik

Country Stores v. Industrial Commission. 860 P.2d 944, 951 (Utah
App. 1993) (addressing a party's failure to comply with rules for
getting an extension of filing deadline).
Also conspicuously absent from respondent's brief is any
effective response to Magcorp's argument that Rules 6(b) and 81(d),
10

U.R.C.P., apply to require UOSH to show excusable neglect before an
extension of time could be granted.

Rule 81(d) provides:

These rules shall apply to the practice and
procedure in appealing from or obtaining a
review of any order, ruling or other action of
an administrative board or agencyf except
insofar as the specific statutory procedure in
connection with any such appeal or review is
in conflict or inconsistent with these rules,
(emphasis added).
It is only through application of Rule 6(b) that the needed
certainty with respect to the time for review may be had in cases
such as this where a party seeks an enlargement of time after the
specified 30 days provided by § 63-46b-12(l)(a) has expired. Rule
6(b) provides:
When by these rules or by a notice given
thereunder or by order of the court an act is
required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may
at any time in its discretion (1) with or
without motion or notice order the period
enlarged if request therefor is made before
the expiration of the period originally
prescribed or as extended by a previous order
or (2) upon motion made after the expiration
of the specified period permit the act to be
done where the failure to act was the result
of excusable neglect; but it may not extend
the time for taking any action under Rules
50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and
73(a) and (g), except to the extent and under
the conditions stated in them.
(emphasis
added).
If this court determines that a motion to enlarge the time provided
by § 63-46b-12(l)(a) is permissible, it necessarily follows that
11

the motion must be made in accord with Rule 6(b) and that excusable
neglect must be shown. Respondent has made no attempt to show, and
under the facts of this case respondent cannot establish, excusable
neglect. "A flat mistake of counsel about the meaning of a statute
or rule may not justify relief: relief
any

kind

of

garden

variety

Mountain Fuel Supply Co..

is

oversight.'"

not

extended

'to

cover

Prowswood, Inc.f v.

676 P.2d 952, 960 (Utah 1984) (footnote

omitted), (citing Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 421
N.E. 2d 67, 73 (1981)). The kind of human error that occurred here
is

not

sufficient

to

warrant

relief.

See

Varian-Eimac

v.

Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 571 (Utah App. 1989); Nunley v. Stan Katz
Real Estate, Inc. , 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798, 801 (1964); In re:
Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah 299, 241 P.2d 462 (1952).
Maverik v. Industrial Commission, relied on by respondent for
the proposition that good cause is the applicable standard, does
not consider, and indeed does not preclude, the application of Rule
6(b)

via

Rule

81(d)

to

enlargements

of

time

sought

in

administrative proceedings after the specified window has closed.
Respondent also fails to address Magcorp's argument that the
Industrial Commission's October 20, 1993 Order Granting Motion For
Extension Of Time [R. 533-537] is an improper nunc pro tunc order.
This court should therefore assume respondent has no justifiable or
meritorious response. UOSH did not file a motion for extension of
12

time with either the ALJ or the Industrial Commission prior to
filing its Motion For Review with the Industrial Commission, and
neither the ALJ nor the Commission addressed the issue at that
time.

The request was not properly raised or preserved by

respondent in the administrative proceeding, therefore, the Order
Granting Motion For Extension Of Time reflected only "what... [the
Industrial Commission] might or should have done had there been a
motion or a hearing.] Southwick v. Leone. 860 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah
App. 1993); see also Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah
1984); Baashaw v. Baashaw. 788 P.2d 1057, 1061 (Utah App. 1990).
This court's limited remand could not revive the jurisdiction the
Industrial Commission was divested of when UOSH failed to file its
Motion For Review in time.
CONCLUSION
Magcorp requests this court to reinstate the ALJ's June 10,
1992 Order and to declare three orders issued by the Industrial
Commission null and void.

The Interim Order Denying Motion To

Dismiss [R. 288-291] entered on October 9, 1992, and the Order
Granting Motion For Review [R. 336-341] entered on December 17,
1992,

were

made

after

the

Industrial

Commission

had

lost

jurisdiction over the case because UOSH failed to file its Motion
For Review within the 30 day window provided by law. This court's
April 29, 1993 limited remand could not, independent of the
13

Industrial Commission's statutory jurisdiction, confer jurisdiction
upon the Industrial Commission.

Thus, the Order Granting Motion

For Extension Of Time [R. 533-538] entered on October 20, 1993, is
also null and void.

The ALJ's June 10, 1992 Order should be

reinstated as, and thereafter remain, the final disposition of this
proceeding.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of July, 1994.
CONDJSK^ WANGSGARD & TSAKALOS

Conder
Peter I^f Rognlie
Attorneys for Magcorp
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